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The ECJ sent shockwaves through the trade unions of Europe in December
2007 with its rulings in the cases of Viking and Laval. In the Viking judgement,
the ECJ denied that it is “inherent in the very exercise of trade union rights and
the right to take collective action that those fundamental freedoms […] will be
prejudiced to a certain degree” (paragraph 52). In Laval it stated that “the freedom
to provide services is one of the fundamental principles of the Community” and that
“a restriction on that freedom is warranted only if it pursues a legitimate objective
compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons of public interest; if
that is the case, it must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which
it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it” (paragraph 101).
With these decisions, the ECJ reduced the right of trade unions to take collective
action and made it subject to the requirements of the four freedoms, effectively
undermining its recognition as a fundamental right according to EU law. In its recent
Holship ruling, the ECtHR has challenged this.
In Holship, the Strasbourg Court explicitly stated that from the perspective of
Article 11 of the ECHR, the freedom of establishment is not a counterbalancing
fundamental right to the freedom of association but rather one element to be
taken into consideration in the assessment of proportionality under Article 11 (2)
ECHR. This has potentially wide-reaching implications for the relationship between
the human rights recognized in international human rights conventions and EU
fundamental freedoms, seen from the perspective of Strasbourg.
Facts of the Case
The background of the case was a conflict over dockworkers` rights to load and
unload ships in the port of Drammen in Norway. According to a collective agreement,
this work was the prerogative of dockworkers, organized in a local enterprise
established by the union and the employer’s association. The Danish Company
Holship challenged this right, with the result that the trade union threatened them
with a boycott action.
The trade union lost the case in the Norwegian Supreme Court, which found the
boycott illegal, as a disproportionate restriction of Holship`s right of establishment
under the EEA-agreement. Under the agreement, the EU acquis regarding the four
freedoms is part of Norwegian law. The case had been referred to the EFTA Court,
which based its opinion on the Vikingand Laval case-law of the ECJ. The EFTA
Court, in reference to the ECJ in Viking, determined the agreement and the boycott
to be a restriction on the right to establishment and set out detailed requirements for
the assessment of the proportionality of this restriction. The Supreme Court followed
up on this stating:
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“The freedom of establishment […] is a fundamental freedom in the EEA, and if the
right to boycott is protected under Article 101, first paragraph, of the Constitution,
these rights must be weighed against each other as part of a consideration of
proportionality. […] [J]ust as rights under the EEA Agreement can justify restriction
of constitutional or conventional human rights, so can constitutional or conventional
human rights justify restrictions of rights under the EEA Agreement” (paragraph 85).
This clearly puts the rights of the constitution, and thus human rights, on the same
footing as the “fundamental freedoms” of the EEA agreement. The Supreme Court,
in other words, mirrored the approach of the ECJ to conflicts between the market
freedoms of EU law and the human rights recognized as fundamental rights under
EU law.
In response, the trade union brought the case to the ECtHR. For matters under
EU law and the jurisdiction of the ECJ, reference to the ECtHR is barred by the so-
called Bosphorus doctrine. According to this doctrine, the ECtHR has declared that
it will not hear cases regarding the implementation of EU law, the EU being “an
organisation to which a Contracting State has transferred jurisdiction is considered to
protect fundamental rights in a manner which can be considered at least “equivalent”
to that for which the Convention provides”. It was therefore presumed that the last
word had been said about the relationship between fundamental freedoms of the EU
and rights of the European convention by the rulings of the ECJ.
Findings
Holship has undone this long-standing assumption. The trade union argued that
the Bosphorus doctrine could not apply to the EEA, since the EEA lacks supremacy
and direct effect, in addition to the absence of the binding legal effect of advisory
opinions from the EFTA Court. The protection of individuals under the EEA is
therefore not equivalent to the protection under the convention – an argument
that the ECtHR accepted. This opened the door for the ECtHR to deal with the
substantive issue of the status of rights under the convention when confronting EU
fundamental freedoms.
The ECtHR explicitly took issue with the ECJ’s statement in Viking that the right
to collective action could not be considered inherent to the very exercise of trade
unions’ rights (paragraph 52). Contrary to this, and closer to reality, the ECtHR
stated in Holship “that for a collective action to achieve its aim, it may have to
interfere with internal market freedoms such as those at issue in the case before
the Supreme Court. […] [C]reating difficulties for the company in respect of loading
and unloading, and the possible negative financial consequences flowing therefrom,
would have been an important point of the boycott” (paragraph 117). In other words,
it is in the nature of a strike or a boycott that it will impede on the exercise of market
freedoms. Not to recognize this is to negate the very right itself. This is exactly what
the ECJ does, when it says that it is not inherent in trade union rights to prejudice the
“fundamental freedoms”.
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In consequence, the mere fact that a collective action restricts a market freedom
does not mean that this action must justify itself under the proportionality test under
EU law. The ECtHR is explicit about this and states that “the degree to which a
collective action risks having economic consequences cannot, therefore, in and of
itself be a decisive consideration in the analysis of proportionality under Article 11,
paragraph 2 of the Convention” (paragraph 117).
Implications
The ECtHR’s findings in Holship have implications far beyond trade union rights
and Article 11 of the ECHR, and go to the core of the ECJ jurisprudence on the
protection of human rights. In dealing with other human rights than the right to
collective bargaining, the ECJ has not been as clear in subjecting the human right
to a clear proportionality test under the free-movement doctrine of mandatory
requirements and overriding reasons of public interest. In Schmidberger and Omega,
the ECJ held that the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue, the freedoms
of expression, of assembly and respect for human dignity, did not fall outside the
scope of the provisions of the Treaty. But at the same time, it considered that such
exercise must be reconciled with the requirements relating to rights protected under
the Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see Schmidberger,
paragraph 77, and Omega, paragraph 36).
We now know that such a “reconciliation” through a balancing test is not the correct
response seen from Strasbourg. Referring to Article 11 of the ECHR, the ECtHR
said: “EEA freedom of establishment is not a counterbalancing fundamental right to
freedom of association but rather one element, albeit an important one, to be taken
into consideration in the assessment of proportionality under Article 11, paragraph
2” (paragraph 118). These are clear words. Restrictions of the rights under the
convention must be necessary or proportional, whether they are based on national
law or EU law. EU “fundamental freedoms” do, from this perspective, not enjoy any
privileged position as rights on the same level as the human rights of the convention.
The ECtHR found that there had been no violation of Article 11 ECHR by the
decision of the Supreme Court to uphold the ban on the boycott. The reason for this
was the large margin of appreciation the ECtHR granted the national authorities
in the case, particularly in the light of its specific circumstances. The boycott was
directed towards a third party, and it concerned the priority to the work for the dock
workers as to the workers employed by Holship. Subsequently, the parties had
entered into a new collective agreement.
The result of the ruling, that there had been no violation of the convention by the
Norwegian Supreme Court, makes the remarks on the relationship between the
Convention and the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, albeit indirectly
through dealing with the EEA agreement, even more remarkable. It is difficult to see
this from any other perspective than that the unanimous Fifth Section of the ECtHR
wanted to send a message to the courts in Luxembourg.
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Contrary to the EU, where all “fundamental rights” are on an equal footing (albeit
with a preferred position in practice to the market freedoms, at least when confronted
with labour rights), the ECtHR maintains a hierarchy of rights, where the rights
recognized in the human rights convention are protected by infringements, even by
EU fundamental rights.
It will be interesting to see how the other courts will react. The Norwegian Supreme
Court must in its practice now subordinate the EEA Agreement to the ECHR. This
may put Norway in a position where, to fulfill its obligations under the Convention, it
will find itself in breach of the EEA Agreement. Under Norwegian law, however, the
case seems clear. Most of the Convention rights are recognized in the constitution,
and there is no direct effect and supremacy in the EEA Agreement.
In the EU, things are more complicated. The Bosphorus doctrine prevents direct
clashes between the ECJ and the ECtHR. The ECJ could take the position that the
Holship judgement is only relevant to the EEA, and that it has no significance for EU
law. Under the spirit of judicial dialogue, however, the ECJ should nevertheless read
the Holship ruling closely. It may signal a more assertive ECtHR towards the EU. It
may also indicate that the ECtHR does not regard the protection of labour rights and
other rights protected by the ECHR as at least “equivalent” to those for which the
Convention provides, with implications for the application of the Bosphorus doctrine.
Thinking ahead, in a setting where climate change is entering the realm of
human rights, there is also a potential for stronger conflicts with market freedoms.
Strasbourg may not be willing to leave this issue in the hands of Luxembourg.
Holship must lead to a recalibration of the protection of rights in Europe, where
market freedoms must be exercised within the scope allowed by human rights, and
not the other way round.
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